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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, I study the association between scientific literacy and 
individual opinions on military spending of voting-age Americans using data from the 
2016 General Social Survey. Based on responses to general science knowledge 
questions, I created a scientific knowledge test. Individuals were coded as 
scientifically literate if they answered 10 questions correctly out of the 12 on this 
test. Using multinomial logistic regression models, I found those exhibiting scientific 
literacy were 1.88 times more likely to express the opinion that military spending is 
too high, as compared to individuals classified as not scientifically literate. My 
results were robust to changes in the passing threshold for the test. Given the growing 
role of science and technology in the military, further study of this issue may have 
considerable implications for the education, scientific, and government 
communities. The findings could be applied to arguments related to the 
establishment of voter qualifications, changes in funding to science education, or 
how government agencies convey their spending habits to the public. 
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The individual who does not comprehend basic terms like atom, molecule, 
gravity, or radiation will find it nearly impossible to follow the public 
discussion of scientific results or public policy issues pertaining to science 
and technology. In short, a minimal scientific vocabulary is necessary to be 
scientifically literate.  
—Jon D. Miller, Scientific Literacy 
A. OVERVIEW 
My thesis studies the correlation between scientific knowledge or scientific literacy 
in the voting public and views on military spending. Science and technology permeate all 
areas of society. From the energy that powers everyday tools, through advancements in 
health and medicine, or climate and the environment, advanced scientific concepts and 
technology touch numerous aspects of every citizen’s life. As such, the laws and policies 
related to technological advancements must also progress. In a democratic society, such as 
the United States, voters have the power to change laws and policies on these hard sciences. 
With the ability to vote on a policy involving scientific concepts, it is implied that the voter 
in fact understands these concepts. Without appropriate education on these topics, 
however, voters could make decisions based on a false understanding. The Department of 
Defense (DoD), similar to many areas of the public and private sector, is growing in 
dependence upon advanced scientific concepts and technology. Whether it is stealth 
technology, artificial intelligence, explosive technologies, or nuclear-powered ships, 
technology is pervasive—and expensive. Partially due to this dynamic, the DoD’s budget 
has grown considerably in order to support these programs and their increasing scientific 
and technological dependency (Alic, 2007). The DoD ultimately depends on the support of 
the voting public in order to fund these endeavors. My study looks at whether different 
levels of scientific knowledge are correlated with individual opinions on military spending. 
My hypothesis is that a greater degree of scientific knowledge, or scientific literacy, 
will result in a higher likelihood of favoring increased defense spending. It may be that 
having a higher level of scientific understanding means a deeper appreciation for the 
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sciences’ complexity, effort, and most importantly, associated costs. This understanding 
logically would then extend to the DoD’s growing dependence on science and technology, 
leading the scientifically literate voter to form the opinion that more money is required to 
sustain those defense advancements. 
The implications of this connection between scientific literacy and opinions and 
voting habits could have significant impacts across government, education, and scientific 
fields. The results could be applied to arguments for or against the establishment of voter 
qualifications, changes in funding to science education, or how government agencies 
convey their spending habits to the public. 
I study the association between scientific literacy and individual opinions on 
military spending by voting age Americans using data from the 2016 General Social Survey 
(GSS) (General Social Survey, 2016). Based on responses to general science knowledge 
questions, I created a scientific knowledge test. Individuals were coded as scientifically 
literate if they answered 10 questions correctly out of the 12 on this test. Using multinomial 
logistic regression models, I found those exhibiting scientific literacy were 1.88 times more 
likely to express the opinion that military spending is too high, as compared to individuals 
classified as not scientifically literate. 
I estimated six models, incrementally adding independent variables. The 
multinomial logistic regression models showed the same directional viewpoint with a 
similar magnitude, regardless of the set of individual variables included. Relative to 
respondents who failed the scientific knowledge exam, those who passed were 
substantially more likely to hold the opinion that we spend too much on defense, even when 
accounting for veteran status, political party affiliation, and a range of demographic factors. 
Specific controls of interest provided both expected and unexpected results. 
Veterans and Republicans were each much more likely to believe we spend too little on 
the military. The oldest age group (those 66 and older) were also far more likely to feel that 
too little is spent on defense. Compared to those with less than a high school diploma, 
respondents with a bachelor’s or graduate degree were much more likely to think the nation 
spends too much on the military. Female respondents provided the most surprising finding. 
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Compared to men, this group was less likely to think we spend too much on defense, 
showing nearly the same magnitude and direction as Republicans.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The concept of scientific literacy dates back to the 1950s with the advent of nuclear 
power, and the growing concern for environmental protection (Miller, 1983). With these 
public concerns, voters were faced with forming opinions and making decisions that 
required some level of scientific understanding. As stated by researcher Jon Miller, “in a 
democratic society the level of scientific literacy in the population has important 
implications for science policy decisions” (Miller, 1983, p. 29).   
In the 1960s, voters were often asked to vote on laws and regulations involving 
scientific concepts, such as nuclear power (Miller, 1983). As more science-based issues 
appeared on state referenda, there was “apprehension in the scientific community about the 
public’s ability to understand the issues and to make an informed judgement” (Miller, 1983, 
p. 31) Miller concluded that “the level of scientific literacy in the United States is 
deplorably low” and corrective actions “will improve the quality of both our science and 
technology and our political life” (Miller, 1983, p. 29). 
DeBoer (2000) commented in his work that “science education can help develop 
informed citizens who are prepared to deal intelligently with science-related social issues, 
to vote responsibly, and to influence, where appropriate, policies related to the impact of 
science on society” (p. 592). This notion of responsible voting readily applies to the realm 
of national defense, as DeBoer (2000) continues that, “the relationship between science 
and society involved the growing perception that scientific and technological developments 
were an important resource for national security” (p. 585).   
Among the studies directed in the field of scientific literacy, the National Science 
Board conducted a study between 1979 and 1981 aiming to identify public attitudes toward 
science and technology (Miller, 1983). The results of the survey indicated that 20 percent 
of American adults followed scientific matters and had a greater appreciation for sciences. 
This was a shockingly low number, corroborating the notion that scientific literacy among 
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the masses was low (Miller, 1983). Without correction, this deficiency would have serious 
implications on greater society in the future. 
In an attempt to remedy this level of scientific literacy, the American Association 
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) established criteria for core education standards 
in U.S. schools. The list of criteria for what core science education should achieve involves 
the question, “Is the proposed content likely to help citizens participate intelligently in 
making social and political decisions involving science and technology?” (American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, n.d.). Unfortunately, even with the advent of 
core scientific education, scientific literacy still has not improved. In 2016, the University 
of Michigan conducted a survey testing civic scientific literacy, to determine if respondents 
had the knowledge required of a citizen to understand basic scientific concepts, “such as 
the nature of matter, the structure of a molecule or DNA, and the application of probability 
to simple problems” (Miller, 2016, p. 2). The results of the study found that only 28 percent 
of American adults met this qualification of civic scientific literacy. This outcome was 
consistent with results from a similar Michigan study in 2008, indicating that this status 
has not improved over the past decade, despite efforts of academia (Miller, 2016). Miller 
concludes that “given the growing number of public policy issues that involve science or 
technology, the failure of the rate of civic scientific literacy to grow in the past decade is 
troubling” (Miller, 2016, p. 4). 
Miller’s definition of scientific literacy, as used in the 2016 University of Michigan 
survey is one of the more elementary standards (Miller, 2016). While it asked basic 
scientific knowledge questions, some researchers such as A. B. Arons (1983), qualify 
scientific literacy as encompassing far more. Beyond just scientific knowledge, he states 
that scientific literacy also includes concepts such as experimental design, various research 
methods, scientific hypothesis testing, scientific philosophy, and theory (Arons, 1983). As 
he states in his explanation, students should not limit themselves to being able to answer 
whether the earth revolves around the sun, but also to ask why we believe that the earth 
revolves around the sun (Arons, 1983). Based on the outcomes of the elementary definition 
of scientific literacy, a more sophisticated definition such as that of Arons’, would likely 
yield an even poorer result. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter reviews the relevant literature pertaining to this study. The first 
section covers previous research using GSS data. Then, section two summarizes studies 
that measure scientific literacy in the United States. Section three discusses studies 
on national defense spending preferences. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of 
the literature.  
A. GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY STUDIES 
The GSS is a survey for researchers seeking data on contemporary American 
society. Since its formation in 1972, GSS sociological and attitudinal trend data enables 
scholars to investigate a wide variety of topics of special interest such as attitudes on race 
relations, the existence and nature of God, and government spending. Previous research 
using GSS data has ranged from simple statistical applications such as comparisons of 
sample averages to more complex endeavors involving, for example, probit and logit 
regression models.  
In one study for example, Raden (1989) uses a national probability sample of 1,323 
Caucasians from the 1982 GSS to study the correlates of prejudice with a series of 
authoritarianism and conservatism-related variables. Although statistically simplistic in 
nature, the author’s analysis met his intended purpose “to provide a considerably more 
comprehensive GSS-based picture of the syndromic qualities of racial prejudice than is 
now available” (Raden, 1989, p. 54). His findings suggest that the relationship between 
prejudice and political conservatism is generally weaker than might be expected based on 
prior research. Understanding the limitations of his study, the author appropriately notes 
there are problems moving from descriptive statistics to causal inferences (Raden, 1989). 
The author’s study does not seek to establish a causal relationship because his methodology 
exclusively uses the creation of correlation matrices, without any deeper analysis.  
In the first study to substantially investigate perceptions pertaining to long-term 
trends in job security, Schmidt (1999) uses a series of cross-sectional GSS surveys from 
1977 to 1996. She uses two different dependent variables measuring job security beliefs. 
6 
Of interest to my study, both dependent variables are Likert scale responses. Schmidt 
(1999) deals with the multiple responses by creating a binary dependent variable whereby 
some answers qualify for a value equal to one. For example, when asked “Thinking about 
the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid off—
very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?,” workers who believed there 
was some degree of likelihood in job loss were coded as one, while both not likely 
responses received a value of zero (Schmidt, 1999, p. S133). To estimate the effects of 
independent variables on binary dependent variables, the author uses probit models to 
analyze trends in job security beliefs, while controlling for variability in the structure of 
the labor force over time (Schmidt, 1999). The author finds that economic recovery years 
in the mid-1990s left workers feeling more concerned about holding onto their jobs and 
about costly job loss relative to previous economic recoveries in the late 1970s and 1980s 
(Schmidt, 1999). 
Of additional relevance to my research is Schmidt’s (1999) recognition that many 
surveys ask similar questions using different wording that may affect a respondent’s 
answers. Within her study, Schmidt found that regardless of question wording or ordering 
in the other surveys, responses were largely unaffected. Thus, Schmidt (1999) concludes 
that because these answers were similar, GSS surveys were a reliable indicator of public 
attitudes.  
Brace, Sims-Butler, Arceneaux, and Johnson (2002) use the GSS disaggregated to 
the state level to test specific measures of state-level opinions on a range of issues. To 
understand the conditions where a national sample can create representative state samples, 
the authors conduct a simulation. The authors focus on two measures of interest. The first 
is coverage—the degree to which primary sampling units represent a state’s population. 
They find that as coverage of the total population decreases, bias increases. The second 
measure is homology—the degree to which distribution attributes within a primary 
sampling unit is similar in proportion to that of the state. The authors also find that when 
homology decreases, bias increases as well (Brace et al., 2002). Relevant to my research, 
they use two variables related to government spending, with three possible responses. They 
assessed attitudes regarding spending on welfare and the environment using the question 
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of whether the country spends too much, too little, or about the right amount. The authors 
code the “too much” response as zero, “about right” as one half, and “too little” as one. 
This choice of coding implies that higher scores indicate that respondents support higher 
government spending on welfare and the environment. Additionally, regression models in 
the study suggest “specific opinion measures compare favorably with the explanatory 
power of general political ideology” (Brace et al., 2002, p. 183). 
Research by Fong (2001) is of interest because a portion of the author’s study 
utilizes the same dependent variable from the GSS as this study: opinion on spending levels 
for the military, armaments, and defense. The author uses ordered probit models to predict 
support for several federal programs, including national defense (Fong, 2001). These 
models include independent variables central to the author’s thesis, but of note for my study 
is Fong’s use of five demographic variables in the GSS: income, education, race, gender, 
and age (Fong, 2001). There are three possible responses for opinions on military spending: 
that we spend (1) too little, (2) about the right amount, or (3) too much. Unlike Brace et al. 
(2002), a response of “don’t know” is coded as missing (Fong, 2001). However, similar to 
Brace et al. (2002), Fong (2001) inverted response ordering to reflect an increase in military 
spending support. The author investigates whether opinions on redistribution stem from an 
individual’s beliefs about distributive justice or from one’s own self-interest. Fong (2001) 
concludes that beliefs about self-determination “are strong predictors of support for 
redistribution in the full, high-income, and low-income samples” (p. 240). 
Cushing-Daniels and Yeung (2009) use pooled, cross-sectional data from the 1988 
to 2006 GSS to examine the effects of sexual orientation on earnings. When discussing 
previous research conducted on this topic that also utilizes GSS data, they note familiar 
results in their ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions. However, unlike earlier results, 
when they correct for differential selection into full-time work, the wage penalty/premium 
for gay/lesbian workers is statistically different (Cushing-Daniels & Yeung, 2009). This 
study highlights the need to address the sample selection bias, which in this case is solved 
using the Heckman selection method. 
Most GSS studies document interesting associations among variables of interest 
but have little intention of addressing causal relationships. Simple correlation matrices 
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present unique perspectives, but even analysis with multivariate regressions do not provide 
evidence of causality. Omitted variables bias is an issue for most of these studies, 
potentially biasing the effect of observed covariates upward or downward. In the next 
section, I discuss studies pertaining to scientific knowledge in the United States. 
B. SCIENTIFIC LITERACY 
Most of the academic literature on scientific knowledge or scientific literacy is 
qualitative in nature. Since I have noted several examples in the Background section, here 
I focus on a few research papers with a quantitative component.  
Sherkat (2001) analyzes religion and scientific literacy in the United States, 
specifically examining how fundamentalist views of the Bible affect scientific literacy. He 
finds that those with fundamentalist beliefs, such as sectarian Protestants and Catholics, 
have a significantly lower level of scientific literacy relative to secular Americans. Sherkat 
(2001) also discovers that the negative influence on scientific knowledge due to religious 
factors is more impactful than gender, race, or income. On average, respondents who held 
a literal interpretation of the Bible answered far fewer scientific knowledge questions 
correctly than those who believed the Bible is a book of fictitious stories. 
Using a similar methodology as this study, Sherkat uses the 2006 GSS that 
incorporates 13 areas related to scientific facts and reasoning. For his specific use, a 
scientific knowledge question regarding evolution was removed, as a respondent’s answer 
may vary depending on his or her faith (Sherkat, 2001). Of relevance to my research design 
is the necessary restriction of the sample to include only respondents who take the science 
exam and answer all scientific knowledge questions. This sample restriction for Sherkat 
resulted in a random sample of 1,863 respondents out of the 4,510 respondents in the 
2006 GSS. The sample would have to be pared down further due to missing values on the 
covariates. The author’s dependent variable of interest is predicted science scores, and he 
used OLS regressions to estimate them.  
Miller (1998) provides the most helpful research for my study, as he outlines the 
prudent way to measure civic scientific literacy. This term is really what is meant when 
other authors discuss scientific knowledge or scientific literacy. Miller (1998) defines civic 
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scientific literacy as “a level of understanding of scientific terms and constructs sufficient 
to read a daily newspaper or magazine and to understand the essence of competing 
arguments on a given dispute or controversy” (p. 204). Although Miller compares civic 
scientific literacy results across nations, his analysis is beneficial to the way I utilize the 
scientific knowledge exam from GSS data. For example, he notes that closed-ended 
questions have become popular because they are simpler to administer even though open-
ended questions enable researchers to obtain a more accurate measure of understanding. 
Both the 1992 Eurobarometer study and the 1995 United States study referenced by Miller 
(1998) include a majority of closed-ended questions similar to those found in the GSS, 
some of which are identical.  
For research purposes, there must be a minimum score on a multi-question test 
that would determine whether an individual possesses civic scientific literacy. Similar 
to his previous studies, Miller (1998) uses the 67-point level as his threshold, which 
reflects the ability of a test-taker to get two-thirds of the possible points on the exam. 
For the 1995 U.S. data, 27.2 percent of Americans scored at or above this level, 
demonstrating that around three in four adults were “unable to read and understand 
news or other information that utilized basic scientific constructs such as DNA, 
molecule, or radiation” (Miller, 1998, p. 213). The 27.2 percent qualifying as being 
scientifically literate from the 1995 studyis similar to the 28 percent figure found in 
research conducted in both 2008 and 2016 (Miller, 2016).
To address an individual’s knowledge of scientific study, a survey question may 
ask what it means to investigate something scientifically (Miller, 2004). An appropriate 
response to this open-ended question would mention the need to use an experimental 
method (Miller 2004). Miller explains that to evaluate the understanding of experiments, a 
question using a drug trial scenario is asked, looking for answers that explain the logic of 
control and treatment groups. Evaluating a respondent’s grasp of probability is often 
determined by a question that involves an example of an inherited illness. Other measures 
of assessment include a recognition that astrology is not scientific and knowledge of 
specific scientific concepts that represent physical and biological science (Miller, 2004). 
Miller also notes that questions about widely used items such as antibiotics and lasers are 
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applied to evaluate an individual’s knowledge of products developed through scientific 
research. In subsequent chapters, most of these questions will be identified in the 2016 GSS 
used in my research. I use similar inquires to create a comprehensive scientific knowledge 
exam. With relevance to a component of my thesis and its significance, Miller (2004) states 
that the current level of scientific literacy among U.S. adults “is still problematic for a 
democratic society that values citizen understanding of major national policies and 
participation in the resolution of important policy disputes” (p. 273). Therefore, an 
individual’s level of scientific knowledge may affect his or her views on military spending, 
a topic I turn to next. 
C. OPINIONS ON MILITARY SPENDING 
The dynamics and significance of the Cold War made it a popular period for the 
assessment of changing opinions on defense spending. The arms race, which was driven 
by increases in military spending by both the United States and the Soviet Union, provided 
various unique covariates for investigation. Hartley and Russet (1992) cover that time 
frame using regression models to determine if changes in military spending (dependent 
variable) are influenced by changes in public support for military spending (key 
independent variable). In their analysis, they use average pooled public opinion 
measurements from six different survey organizations including the one responsible for the 
GSS (Hartley & Russet, 1992). They determine that holding other factors constant, when 
public opinion rises for supporting increases in defense spending, the level of military 
spending will increase as well (Hartley & Russet, 1992). 
Eichenberg and Stoll (2012) extend their period of review to include the post-cold 
war years, implementing regression models for data from 1967 to 2007. They use Gallup 
polls rather than the GSS for information on military spending opinions, because, among 
other reasons, the survey series began earlier than the GSS. The authors aim to provide 
more information on gender politics using time series research and conclude that, on 
average, men are more supportive of military spending than women. Eichenberg and Stoll 
also found that the variation of support for military spending among males and females 
was similar over time, mostly influenced by the previous year’s change in defense 
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spending, war casualties, and differences between military and civilian spending. This 
finding is supportive of a concept called “parallel publics” developed by Page and Shapiro 
(1992) in which subgroup policy preferences move in tandem over time, despite having 
different average levels of support. 
Witko (2003) uses quarterly time-series data from 1969 to 1989 to explore “how 
the public responded to political events when forming defense-spending preferences during 
the cold war” (p. 380). The World Event Interaction Survey (WEIS) event data set was 
used for the author’s key independent variable, since it contains actual events and 
statements made by political leaders from both sides of the conflict. Witko generates his 
dependent variable from the defense-spending opinion index, which was created through 
the compilation of three survey organizations: American National Election Studies, Gallup, 
and National Opinion Research Center (in charge of conducting the GSS). Questions from 
different survey houses are worded differently; however, all three ask whether the 
respondent favors more defense spending, less defense spending, or the same amount. 
Important control variables include military spending for a given year, changes in public 
mood, and a Vietnam War dummy variable to account for an additional threat that could 
influence defense spending opinions. 
Witko constructs Soviet and U.S. belligerence variables by using WEIS data that 
include physical events such as troop movements and verbal or written statements by 
leaders that were considered either threatening or conciliatory in nature (Witko, 2003). He 
finds that U.S. belligerence influenced Americans’ opinions toward the Soviets; however, 
Soviet belligerence did not have a significant effect on Americans’ views (Witko, 2003). 
Other key findings show that when the United States behaved in a more aggressive manner 
toward the Soviets, the American public expressed greater support for military spending. 
It is possible that this finding is due to reverse causality, as defense spending opinions may 
have influenced U.S. belligerence. Actual defense spending exhibits a statistically 
significant negative effect on defense spending opinions, showing that during times of 
elevated military spending, the public becomes less favorable to more increases in military 
spending (Witko, 2003). 
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Like Witko (2003), Knopf (1998) also looks at public opinion on military spending 
during the Cold War using a similar average of a collection of surveys from 1965 to 1991. 
The author also uses the same approach as Witko to define the dependent variable. Knopf 
defines the dependent variable as the net percentage difference favoring a military spending 
increase, derived by taking the difference between the percentage claiming that too little is 
spent and the percentage claiming that too much is spent. This method is preferred for 
capturing the movement in public opinion in time series studies (Knopf, 1998). Despite 
using different data sources, both studies control for a similar set of factors such as military 
spending, Vietnam, and Soviet behavior. Knopf also controls for the annual federal budget 
deficit to account for domestic economic constraints affecting opinions on military 
spending levels.  
Knopf uses multiple regression analysis and utilizes a series of time lags to explore 
the extent to which there is delay between changing conditions and the public response 
(Knopf, 1998). His first test “finds little evidence for the traditionalist hypothesis that there 
will be dangerous delays before the public responds to changes in external threat” (Knopf, 
1998, p. 557). An interesting finding exists with regard to the magnitude of results. 
Pertaining to military spending, Knopf concludes that if the Soviet Union outspent the 
United States by $10 billion (in constant 1970 dollars) the opinion shift would be less than 
4 percent. Yet, the author notes that previous research has shown that only opinion shifts 
of 6 percent or more are considered significant (Knopf, 1998). 
All of the above studies focus on sentiments around the Cold War era. Bartels 
(1994) examines this question by using post-Cold War data. He analyzes the determinants 
of defense spending preferences in 1992 using data from the American National Election 
Study (NES) survey from that year. Defense spending preferences are reported on a seven-
point scale, whereby all responses fall between the extremes of -1 (greatly decrease defense 
spending) and +1 (greatly increase defense spending). Key explanatory variables include 
“general political ideology, attitudes toward Russia, willingness to use force, isolationism, 
and economic stakes in the Pentagon budget” (Bartels, 1994, p. 481). Of note is that the 
author still includes a control for a respondent’s feelings toward Russia, as this may still 
be an influential factor on the dependent variable. His economic stakes variable captures 
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the fact that some individuals are beneficiaries of DoD budgetary spending in their state. 
All else equal, Bartels (1994) finds that conservatives and isolationists, as well as residents 
whose states are net beneficiaries from DoD spending, all favored more military spending. 
D. SUMMARY 
The GSS provides a vast array of information on attitudes of the American public. 
Therefore, researchers have used this source to conduct studies with a varied range of 
topics, such as exploring prejudice, perceptions about job security, predictors of support 
for income redistribution, and the effect of sexual orientation on earnings. Although a 
preponderance of peer reviewed literature on the issue of scientific knowledge discusses 
history, theory, and definitions, some researchers such as Miller, have provided 
quantitative results showing that only 28 percent of Americans qualify as being 
scientifically literate (Miller, 2016). Studies relating to opinions on defense spending levels 
have utilized numerous survey organizations and often focused on a long period of time to 
intentionally cover the Cold War era. However, Bartels (1994) measures key determinants 
of military spending preferences in a more recent foreign policy climate after the 
conclusion of the Cold War period.  
The literature above is used to obtain guidance for control variables, such as 
income, education, race, gender, and age. My study builds upon this literature on changes 
in defense spending preferences over time by investigating more recent opinions in a very 














III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter’s primary focus is to describe the data used in my regression models. 
I also explain the construction of the dependent and key independent variables. The first 
section discusses the data set and the sample population that was surveyed. Then, I describe 
the creation of key variables and conclude with a discussion of the discrete-choice 
methodology. 
A. DATA 
Data for this study come from the 2016 GSS, which was the latest available 
information at the time of this thesis (General Social Survey, 2016). The GSS is the longest-
running survey project managed by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at 
the University of Chicago. The GSS is a nationally representative random sample of adults 
(18 years or older) living in households in the United States. Since 1994, the GSS has been 
administered in even numbered years. Beginning in 2006, this survey began including 
Spanish speaking Americans in their samples in addition to the previous standard of 
English speakers. A vast majority of GSS data is collected during face-to-face interviews. 
In rare cases, telephone interviews may take place if an in-person interview is difficult to 
set up with a sampled respondent. GSS interviews last approximately 90 minutes, but all 
questions are not asked of all respondents. For example, some queries may not be 
applicable to certain respondents and other questions may not be included in all samples. 
The GSS uses two samples, each subdivided into multiple ballots. The survey includes a 
standard core of questions that are asked of all respondents, covering topics such as 
demographic and attitudinal information. In a given year, topics of special interest such as 
the role of government or religion are also included and may only be asked in one out of 
two samples.  
B. SAMPLE POPULATION 
The response rate for the 2016 survey was 61.3 percent of targeted respondents, 
which was the second lowest in the past 40 years. Only the previous survey from 2014 had 
a lower response rate (60.2 percent). The 2016 GSS did not oversample certain groups, 
16 
unlike the 1982 and 1987 GSS, which oversampled black respondents. Each of the two 
samples for the 2016 GSS had a target sample size of 1,500. In order to confirm that the 
results of the survey are scientifically valid, a random selection of households across the 
country was chosen. This selection is aimed to represent a cross-section of the United 
States. Accordingly, each household has an equal chance of being selected to participate. 
Then, an adult member of the household is randomly selected to complete the interview. 
The 2016 GSS provides data from 2,867 respondents. Of this total, a random sample of 
1,390 individuals were given a scientific knowledge exam. I used responses to this exam 
to construct my key independent variable. More specifics on this measure are provided in 
the section below. 
C. KEY VARIABLES 
This thesis studies the effect of civic scientific literacy on opinions related to 
defense spending. In this section, I explain how I constructed the dependent and 
independent variables used in this inquiry. First, I explain the construction of the dependent 
variable of interest—military spending preferences. I follow with an explanation of the key 
independent variable—scientific knowledge. Finally, I explain the control variables 
divided into the following broad categories: demographics, veteran status, political party 
affiliation, level of interest in international issues, and level of interest in military policy. 
The 2016 GSS collected opinions on military spending levels by asking two 
questions to different groups of respondents. One question asked respondents if we are 
spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on the military, armaments, and 
defense (General Social Survey, 2016). This question was asked of 1,437 participants. In 
another question, respondents were asked, in regard to national defense, whether we are 
spending too much money, too little money, or about the right amount. This question was 
asked of the remaining 1,430 individuals out of the total sample of 2,867. For each 
question, responses were coded one, two, or three, respectively. Those believing that the 
country spends “too little” on defense received a value of one. Those believing we spend 
an amount that is “about right” received a value of two. The remaining individuals who felt 
the U.S. spends “too much” on the military were given a value of three. Using this 
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information, I constructed a new variable, “military_spending,” that combined responses 
to both questions. If respondents answered “too little” on both questions, I coded this 
response with a value of one. If they answered “too much” for both questions, I applied a 
value of three. Respondents claiming about the right amount is spent received a value of 
two. I dropped all responses from individuals who claimed they “don’t know” or who 
provided “no answer.” 
To determine whether a respondent exhibits civic scientific literacy, I created a 
scientific knowledge test. The test includes 12 questions that cover both the vocabulary 
construct dimension and process knowledge dimension of civic scientific literacy discussed 
by Miller (1998). All test questions were closed-ended, and 11 of the questions were 
identical to those used by Sherkat (2011) in his 13-question science examination using 
2006 GSS data. Considered to be elementary concepts, the questions were in either 
true/false format, or limited multiple choice format. To earn a point for a test question, the 
respondent had to answer the question correctly. Indicating that he or she did not know the 
answer or not answering the question at all were considered incorrect and received a score 
of zero. Not knowing the answer was the same thing as getting the answer wrong in this 
case because I am trying to determine if an individual is scientifically literate. An admission 
of not knowing signifies the respondent does not understand the concept being asked. 
The mean score for Sherkat’s exam was 8.4, thus the average percentage score for his 
13-question test was around 65 percent (Sherkat, 2001). For my 12-question science test, 
the mean score is eight, yielding an average performance of 67 percent. The scientific 
knowledge test questions and respective percent correct are shown in Table 1 of the 
Results chapter.  
Next, I determined how many total questions were answered correctly by 
respondents in order to identify a cut-off point for passing or failing the exam. As 
previously noted, Miller (1998) uses a 67-point level as his threshold. This level is obtained 
in my test when a respondent answered eight or more questions correctly out of the 12 total. 
However, nearly 61 percent of respondents performed at this level, indicating that over half 
demonstrated civic scientific literacy. This figure is far too high, particularly given that 
Miller (2016) found this measure to be around 28 percent not only as recently as 2016, but 
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over the past decade as well. His analysis involved tests that were more difficult, often 
including open-ended survey questions which respondents performed much worse on than 
the closed-ended questions (Miller, 1998). The GSS test questions I use are not open-
ended, so it is reasonable that respondents performed better on the scientific knowledge 
exam used for this study. To achieve a similar scientific literacy rate as established in prior 
studies, I set the pass/fail threshold at 10 or more questions being correctly answered. Only 
31 percent of respondents performed at this level, similar to the 28 percent that Miller has 
identified as scientifically literate over many years. Therefore, respondents who answered 
10 or more of the test questions correctly are considered to possess civic scientific literacy. 
In my models, I include a binary variable where a passing score takes on a value of one, 
and a failing score receives a zero. Table 2 in the Results chapter lists the percentage of 
respondents with each test score. I also ran robustness checks using eight questions or nine 
questions correct as the cut-off for passing the exam. 
Since individual demographics can be correlated with both scientific literacy and 
preferences on military spending, I used the following control variables in my regressions: 
gender, education, age, race, marital status, and income. To account for potential 
differences in opinions due to gender, I included an indicator for females. To control for 
differences in education, I created indicator variables based on the highest degree earned 
by the respondent. These indicators include those who have less than a high school 
diploma, high school, junior college, a bachelor’s degree, or a graduate degree. Those 
individuals with less than a high school diploma serve as the reference group in my 
regressions.  
For the 2016 GSS, the age of respondents ranged from 18 to those 89 and older. 
These values were presented as a continuous variable. Adding age as a variable only allows 
for the liner effects of age. I preferred to include the full set of age dummy variables with 
indicators for each age because it would be more flexible and allow for non-linear age 
effects. However, adding individual age dummy variables for each age would have been 
too much given the number of observations. So, I grouped individuals into the following 
age categories: 18–25 (reference group), 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, and those aged 
66 and older.  
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The survey divided race into three categories: white, black, and other. I constructed 
indicators for each group with white as the reference group in the regressions. To control 
for marital status, all non-married (widowed, divorced, separated, or never married) 
respondents received a value of zero, while married individuals take on a value of one. 
A respondent’s family income is used to account for differences in income levels. 
Total family income ranged from under $1,000 to $170,000 or more, and were reported in 
very narrow bins. I broke the various levels into the following six income bins: below 
$25,000 (reference group), $25,000–$49,999, $50,000–$74,999, $75,000–$109,999, 
$110,000–$149,999, and those earning $150,000 and above. For the age and income 
variables, I wanted to produce results for commonly-identified income and age groups, 
such as those likely retired or near retirement and low-income families. 
Opinions on the level of defense spending may be influenced by whether an 
individual has served in the military. To account for this factor, I include a binary variable 
for being a veteran. The GSS asked respondents the number of years they have spent in the 
Armed Forces. I designated any number of years above zero to receive veteran status. One 
survey response category was service for less than two years. Thus, their inclusion in the 
veteran variable may dampen the effect of being a veteran—it is possible that such a short 
service period means the individual does not share the same feelings or views toward the 
military as a service member who at least completed one service contract. 
Political ideology affects opinions on many policies, foreign and domestic; 
therefore, it must be controlled for in my regression analysis. The GSS asked survey 
participants to state their political party affiliation on an eight-item scale. The GSS 
categories for political affiliation were: strong democrat, not strong democrat, independent 
near democrat, independent, other party, strong republican, not strong republican, 
independent near republican. Of these categories, six identified with either the Republican 
or Democratic party. I converted the information into a binary variable that grouped three 
of the categories into Republicans, and all non-Republicans (Democrats, Independents, 
other party affiliations) were given a value of zero.  
A citizen who is interested in both international issues and military policy may be 
predisposed to certain beliefs about the proper level of military spending. Therefore, I 
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controlled for both categories in my regressions. Survey participants were asked if they are 
very interested, moderately interested, or not at all interested in international issues and 
military policy. I created two binary variables, one for each topic, with those who are very 
interested or moderately interested receiving a value of one, and those who are not at all 
interested receiving a value of zero.  
D. METHODS 
In keeping with my research question, my dependent variable assessed 
respondent’s opinions on military spending. The survey allowed for three responses, thus 
the natural choice of estimation method is multinomial logistic regression. To interpret the 
coefficients, I used relative risk ratios. Additionally, under the multinomial model, I set the 
“about right” response as the baseline which served as a comparison for the opinions 
expressing that too little or too much is spent on the military.  
A multinomial logistic regression model is a type of discrete choice model. The 
outcome choices in my model are distinct and mutually exclusive: individuals only can 
choose one option. Therefore, the ordering of opinions that we spend too much, too little, 
or about the right amount does not matter. The survey question about military spending 
preferences does not provide a single choice for participants. If participants were merely 
asked if they think we should spend more on defense, then the data would come in a binary 
form and the model would be a discrete binary choice model. However, with three response 
options for the survey question, these multiple preferences require a multinomial 
choice model. 
Since the choices cannot be ordered, dependent variables of this type are often 
modeled as multinomial logit estimated by maximum likelihood methods to evaluate the 
probability of categorical membership. The logic of this model is to interpret the regression 
coefficients relative to some base, which I establish as the opinion that we spend about the 
right amount on the military. The log odds of the outcome choices are estimated as a linear 
combination of the independent variables in my model. The ratio of the probability of 
choosing the outcome category of “too much” or “too little” over the probability of 
choosing the baseline of “about right” is described as relative risk. Such relative risk ratios 
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allow for a standard interpretation of the coefficients, namely they provide a relative risk 
ratio for a unit change in the independent variable.  
I estimated six models where independent variables were entered incrementally in 
groups. Model 1 looks at opinions on military spending as explained by my key 
independent variable—scientific knowledge. Model 2 includes controls for the most basic 
demographic factors such as gender, race, and age of the individual. Model 3 adds the 
remaining demographic categories of income, education, and marital status. Model 4 
includes the veteran status of respondents. Model 5 includes an additional control for 
political party affiliation. Model 6, the most comprehensive model, adds controls for 
interest in international issues and military policy. 
Even though I include a broad set of control variables, this analysis cannot be 
interpreted as a causal effect of scientific literacy on preferences for military spending. 
Rather, it estimates an association between scientific literacy and preferences for military 
spending controlling for a large set of demographic variables that are likely correlated with 
the two. Despite the large set of controls, individuals who are scientifically literate are 
likely to be different from those who are not in both observable and unobservable 
dimensions. Hence, omitted variables bias is an important concern. While we do not want 
to interpret these coefficients as causal estimates, these associations are nonetheless very 
interesting because they inform us about the factors influencing individual opinions on 
defense spending in the United States. In the next chapter, I turn to summary statistics and 










This chapter describes the results from my multinomial logistic regression models 
introduced in the previous chapter. I begin by discussing my key independent variable 
and address how well respondents answered the scientific knowledge exam questions. 
I then provide a summary of my dependent variable, showing the breakdown of opinions 
on military spending. Next, I present the descriptive statistics for the full GSS sample and 
the truncated regression sample. I also display my regression results and include 
interpretations of the relative risk ratios of statistical significance. Finally, I discuss my 
results regarding a robustness check that incorporates a lower passing threshold for the 
scientific literacy exam.  
A. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE TEST RESULTS 
The results for each of the 12 questions from my constructed scientific knowledge 
test are presented in Table 1. There was no single question for which all respondents were 
wrong, nor was there a question that all participants answered correctly.  
The two most problematic questions for respondents involved their understanding 
of lasers and electrons. Only 45 percent of test takers correctly knew that lasers do not work 
by focusing sound waves. Just 48 percent of respondents correctly understood that 
electrons are smaller than atoms. With only a slight improvement, just over half of test 
takers (51 percent) knew that antibiotics do not kill viruses. The best results for respondents 
involved their understanding that the center of the earth is very hot, with 84 percent 
answering this question correctly. Showing similar competency, 81 percent of test takers 
knew that the continents have moved over time and will continue to do so.  
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Table 1. Scientific Knowledge Test Questions 
Percent 
Correct 
State “False” that “Antibiotics kill viruses as well as bacteria” 51 
State “True” that “The center of the Earth is very hot” 84 
State “True” that “Electrons are smaller than atoms” 48 
State that the Earth revolves around the sun and not the other way around 71 
State “True” that “It is the father’s gene that decides whether the baby is 
a boy or a girl” 60 
State “False” that “Lasers work by focusing sound waves” 45 
State “True” that “The continents on which we live have been moving 
their locations for millions of years and will continue to move in the 
future” 81 
State “False” that “All radioactivity is man-made” 69 
State that astrology is “not at all scientific” 60 
Understand the meaning of the probability of one-in-four given an 
example of an inherited illness regarding each child’s risk 73 
Understand the meaning of the probability of one-in-four given an 
example of an inherited illness when first child’s status is identified 83 
State that a two-group experimental model is the best way to test a drug 79 
As noted in the previous chapter, I established a threshold of 10 correct answers to 
identify a passing score, and thus classifying as scientifically literate. To do so, I assessed 
the number of total questions answered correctly by each test taker. The percentage of 
respondents with each test score is shown in Table 2. 
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0 6 0.43 
1 6 0.43 
2 16 1.15 
3 35 2.52 
4 60 4.32 
5 86 6.19 
6 150 10.79 
7 190 13.67 
8 207 14.89 
9 198 14.24 
10 198 14.24 
11 149 10.72 
12 89 6.40 
Total 1,390 100 
 
Of the 1,390 test takers, six respondents answered zero questions correctly. Six 
individuals also only answered one question correctly out of the 12-item exam. A quarter 
of the test takers scored 50 percent or less, answering six or fewer questions correctly. On 
the other end of the spectrum, there were 89 individuals who scored perfectly on the 
knowledge test, equating to roughly 6 percent of all test takers. As noted earlier, the mean 
score on the test was eight with a standard deviation around 2.5, meaning that the average 
performance was a score of 67 percent.  
B. OPINIONS ON MILITARY SPENDING 
Figure 1 shows respondents’ opinions on military spending. The column clusters 
address opinions regarding different samples and question wording. Please note from the 
last section, one set of respondents were asked whether we are spending too much, too 
little, or about the right amount on the military, armaments and defense (question 
“natarms”). The other question asked survey participants if we are spending too much, too 
little, or about the right amount on national defense (question “natarmsy”). One group was 
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asked the first question and the second group was asked the second variant of the question. 
No individuals were asked both questions. Reassuringly, both questions show a near 
identical breakdown of spending opinions. The most prevalent viewpoint was that we 
spend too much on the military, with 38 percent of respondents making this claim 
regardless of question wording. The second most popular view was that we spend about 
the right amount, with 35 percent of survey participants providing this answer. Roughly 
27 percent of respondents felt that the country spends too little on the military. 
The third column cluster shows the combined opinions of all respondents who 
answered either of the above questions. This pooled response serves as my dependent 
variable for the regression analysis that follows. Because the responses are a merged total, 
all opinion categories are represented by roughly the exact percentages as both the above 
figures.  
The final grouping was developed to display the opinions on military spending 
among just the scientific knowledge test takers. There were 1,390 test takers, making up 
roughly 48 percent of the 2,867 respondents in the full GSS sample. This sample of 
respondents shows a slightly more dovish attitude toward defense spending. A belief that 
we spend too much is 1.6 percentage points higher than for the full sample. Additionally, 
the viewpoint that we spend too little on the military is 1.7 percentage points lower than 
the full sample. The overall opinion breakdown for defense spending among the science 
test takers remains in very close alignment with the overall sample of GSS respondents. 
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Figure 1. Opinions on Military Spending 
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
In column one of Table 3, I show summary statistics for the entire survey sample. 
Column two of the table shows the descriptive statistics for the respondents who took the 
scientific knowledge test. This table allows us to see if the scientific knowledge test-takers 
are different from the rest of the GSS sample. They are similar on most dimensions, other 































Too Little About Right Too Much
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Male 46% 43% 
Female 54% 57% 
White  75% 75% 
Black  16% 15% 
Other Race 9% 10% 
Age 18–25 9% 10% 
Age 26–35 18% 20% 
Age 36–45 16% 14% 
Age 46–55 18% 17% 
Age 56–65 19% 19% 
Age 66 and older 19% 20% 
Income below $25,000 26% 26% 
Income $25,000-$49,999 23% 22% 
Income $50,000-$74,999 18% 19% 
Income $75,000-$109,999 15% 15% 
Income $110,000-$149,999 9% 9% 
Income above $150,000 9% 9% 
Less than High School 10% 11% 
High School 51% 50% 
Junior College 8% 8% 
Bachelor’s Degree 19% 19% 
Graduate Degree 12% 12% 
Married 43% 43% 
Veteran 11% 11% 
Republican 33% 35% 
International Issues Interest 87% 73% 
Military Policy Interest 92% 84% 
      
Observations 2,517 1,221 
 
The majority of survey participants and scientific knowledge test takers are female, 
comprising of 54 percent and 57 percent, respectively. Both samples are 75 percent white 
with a near identical breakdown among blacks and other races. Ages were also similar 
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between the total sample and sub-sample, with my regression reference group (age 18–25) 
making up 9 percent and 10 percent, respectively. Family income was also nearly identical 
across all bins, with the same percentage (26 percent) falling into the reference category of 
less than $25,000. Educational degree attainment was similar as well with around half of 
both samples earning a high school diploma. Respondents in each group also received a 
bachelor’s degree and graduate degree in the same proportion, 19 percent and 12 percent, 
respectively. Just under half of each group (43 percent) are married. 
For both samples, 11 percent of respondents are veterans. The group of test takers 
identifying as Republican are just 2 percentage points higher than the overall sample of 
33 percent. The largest deviations between samples were for those expressing an interest 
in international issues and military policy. Notably, 73 percent of test takers take interest 
in international issues, 14 percentage points lower than the full sample. Additionally, 
84 percent of test takers expressed interest in military policy, 8 percentage points lower 
than the total group of respondents.  
D. MULTIVARIATE RESULTS 
Table 4 presents the results of the multinomial logistic regressions for the most 
basic models. Each model contains two columns to cover two of the three outcome 
responses (that we spend too little or too much on the military) with the omitted reference 
group covering the opinion that we spend about the right amount. Relative risk ratios 
greater than one signify that a respondent is more likely to hold the particular opinion in 
the corresponding column relative to the base that about the right amount is spent on the 
military. Relative risk ratios less than one signify that a respondent is less likely to hold the 
particular opinion in the corresponding column relative to the base that about the right 
amount is spent on the military. Regressing only the dependent variable on my key 
independent variable yields statistical and economic significance. As noted in Model 1, 
compared to those who fail, those who pass the scientific knowledge test are 2.09 times 
more likely to think we spend too much on the military, relative to about the right amount. 
The results are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  
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Table 4. Regression Table with Demographic Controls 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Reported as  
relative risk ratios 













Scientific Literacy 1.030 2.086*** 0.977 1.904*** 1.014 1.796*** 
(0.150) (0.324) (0.149) (0.309) (0.164) (0.314) 
Female 1.018 0.603*** 1.036 0.565*** 
(0.142) (0.0925) (0.146) (0.0887) 
Black 0.586*** 0.952 0.647** 0.906 
(0.113) (0.199) (0.128) (0.193) 
Other Race 0.492*** 0.838 0.526*** 0.820 
(0.117) (0.205) (0.128) (0.205) 
Age 26–35 1.622* 1.048 1.494 1.051 
(0.477) (0.277) (0.452) (0.291) 
Age 36–45 2.342*** 0.881 2.169** 0.875 
(0.712) (0.259) (0.682) (0.271) 
Age 46–55 2.014** 0.969 1.844** 1.059 
(0.595) (0.266) (0.566) (0.309) 
Age 56–65 2.730*** 0.586* 2.521*** 0.592* 
(0.781) (0.168) (0.746) (0.178) 
Age 66 and older 3.281*** 0.682 3.382*** 0.642 
(0.942) (0.199) (0.998) (0.195) 
Inc $25K-$49.9K 1.215 1.276 
(0.247) (0.282) 
Inc $50K-$74.9K 1.688** 1.110 
(0.376) (0.279) 
Inc $75K-$109.9K 1.219 0.582* 
(0.296) (0.167) 
Inc $110K-149.9K 1.231 0.848 
(0.359) (0.272) 
Inc above $150K 1.139 0.875 
(0.355) (0.295) 
High School 1.121 0.993 
(0.259) (0.275) 
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VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Reported as  
relative risk ratios 













Junior College         1.137 1.496 
          (0.363) (0.550) 
Bachelor’s Degree         0.962 1.729* 
          (0.273) (0.558) 
Graduate Degree         0.672 2.133** 
          (0.213) (0.737) 
Married         1.221 0.690** 
          (0.192) (0.126) 
Constant 1.094 0.544*** 0.575** 0.891 0.423** 0.869 
  (0.0864) (0.0523) (0.157) (0.224) (0.148) (0.309) 
             
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221       
seEform in parentheses 
       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
        
 
With no controls appearing in Model 1, the effect of scientific literacy is overstated 
due to omitted variables bias. Model 2 adds basic demographic controls for gender, race 
and age. Those who are considered scientifically literate are again much more likely to 
believe that we spend too much on defense. Model 3 builds onto prior controls by adding 
the remaining demographic factors relating to family income, education, and marital status. 
Again, the results indicate that respondents who pass the scientific knowledge exam are far 
more likely to think the government spends too much on the military. The outcome is also 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The magnitude of the association is reduced 
as I control for more factors, although even Model 3 finds that, compared to respondents 
who are not scientifically literate, those who are scientifically literate are around 1.8 times 
more likely to think too much is spent on the military, holding all other variables constant. 
A surprising finding comes from the gender indicator. In both Model 2 and Model 
3, the relative risk ratio for females is inverted from the scientific literacy variable. Rather 
than being above one as found with the key independent variable, the female coefficient is 
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less than one. For example, Model 3 finds that women are less likely than men to think we 
spend too much on defense relative to about the right amount by a factor of 0.57. The 
directional viewpoint of this finding is the opposite of what Eichenberg and Stoll (2012) 
conclude. 
Table 5 uses the same multi-column format as Table 4, but the multinomial logistic 
regressions include more controls. When controlling for veteran status, Model 4 shows 
that the scientific literacy variable increases in magnitude from the prior model. Model 5 
also shows an increase in magnitude once controlling for a respondent’s political 
affiliation. The most comprehensive and final model is Model 6, which adds controls for 
interest in international issues and interest in military policy. The key independent variable 
for all models in Table 5 is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In Model 6, I find 
that, on average, compared to those who fail the scientific literacy test, respondents who 
pass are 1.88 times more likely to think our country spends too much on the military, all 
else equal. 
The indicator for female maintains approximately the same magnitude and 
directional viewpoint in all six models. Model 6 results show that compared to men, women 
are about 0.51 times as likely to think we spend too much on defense relative to about the 
right amount. Regarding race, the coefficient on black is no longer statistically significant 
after I control for other factors in the final model. However, compared to white 
respondents, individuals of other non-black races are 0.61 times as likely to think we spend 
too little on the military relative to about the right amount. This finding is statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level and means that individuals of other races want to spend 
less on defense than whites.  
There are numerous age control groups that are statistically significant, but the 
category of greatest magnitude is for those age 66 and older. Model 6 finds that compared 
to 18–25-year-olds, this group is 3.28 times more likely to believe that we spend too little 
on the military. This outcome represents a very hawkish viewpoint from those respondents 
in the oldest age block. Controlling for family income was important to isolate the true 
effects of scientific literacy on defense spending opinions, but these regression categories 
do not provide any statistically significant insight about income effects.  
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Controls for educational degree attainment are interesting. Regarding Model 6, 
compared to those with less than a high school diploma, respondents with a bachelor’s 
degree are almost twice as likely to think we spend too much on defense. An even stronger 
relationship exists for those with a graduate degree. Respondents with this high level of 
education are 2.09 times more likely to think we spend too much on the military compared 
to those with less than a high school diploma. Both education categories are statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level. Marital status loses much of its statistical significance 
resulting from Model 3 and Model 4 in the last two models. But, assessing the results at 
the 10 percent significance level, compared to those who are not married, married 
respondents are 0.72 times as likely to think we spend too much on the military relative to 
about the right amount. This finding is the same directional opinion as females, although 
with less magnitude. 
The indicator for veteran status yields the expected result. In the most 
comprehensive model, veterans are 1.7 times more likely to think we spend too little on 
the military relative to non-veterans. Also, as expected, Republicans are 2.44 times more 
likely to believe the country spends too little on defense relative to non-Republicans. 
Similar statistical significance at the 1 percent level also exists for the inverse relationship. 
For example, Republicans are 0.42 times as likely to think we spend too much on the 
military compared to about the right amount, relative to non-Republicans. The effects may 
be even larger if the reference group was just Democrats rather than also including 
Independents. This result closely resembles the opinion and impact noted by women, which 
is again surprising, especially when finding a negative correlation between female 
respondents and Republicans. 
The final controls are both statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
Respondents who expressed an interest in international issues are 0.7 times as likely to 
think we spend too little on the military, relative to those with no interest. This group 
believes in less spending for defense relative to then current levels in 2016. However, 
survey participants who claimed to be interested in military policy are 1.67 times more 
likely to believe we spend too little on the military. This group feels there should be more 
money for defense relative to the levels in 2016. 
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Table 5. Regression Table with Additional Controls 
VARIABLES Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Reported as  
relative risk ratios 













Scientific Literacy 1.003 1.823*** 0.981 1.875*** 1.010 1.884*** 
(0.163) (0.319) (0.162) (0.334) (0.168) (0.340) 
Female 1.171 0.537*** 1.277 0.514*** 1.273 0.510*** 
(0.177) (0.0871) (0.198) (0.0848) (0.199) (0.0852) 
Black 0.633** 0.924 0.833 0.774 0.812 0.780 
(0.126) (0.198) (0.171) (0.169) (0.168) (0.170) 
Other Race 0.527*** 0.827 0.582** 0.788 0.613** 0.780 
(0.128) (0.207) (0.144) (0.199) (0.153) (0.198) 
Age 26–35 1.484 1.059 1.623 1.020 1.596 1.033 
(0.450) (0.294) (0.502) (0.288) (0.495) (0.293) 
Age 36–45 2.158** 0.890 2.366*** 0.875 2.394*** 0.870 
(0.679) (0.276) (0.761) (0.274) (0.772) (0.274) 
Age 46–55 1.813* 1.076 1.848* 1.099 1.828* 1.138 
(0.558) (0.315) (0.580) (0.327) (0.575) (0.340) 
Age 56–65 2.461*** 0.612 2.582*** 0.601* 2.582*** 0.616 
(0.731) (0.185) (0.783) (0.184) (0.787) (0.190) 
Age 66 and older 3.094*** 0.696 3.090*** 0.712 3.278*** 0.715 
(0.922) (0.214) (0.939) (0.223) (1.006) (0.226) 
Inc $25K-$49.9K 1.189 1.297 1.181 1.309 1.170 1.312 
(0.243) (0.288) (0.246) (0.294) (0.244) (0.295) 
Inc $50K-$74.9K 1.625** 1.135 1.512* 1.189 1.504* 1.184 
(0.364) (0.286) (0.346) (0.303) (0.345) (0.302) 
Inc $75K-$109.9K 1.212 0.583* 1.236 0.593* 1.251 0.593* 
(0.295) (0.168) (0.307) (0.171) (0.311) (0.171) 
Inc $110K-149.9K 1.198 0.858 1.187 0.841 1.177 0.840 
(0.351) (0.275) (0.354) (0.274) (0.353) (0.274) 
Inc above $150K 1.133 0.875 1.013 0.888 1.019 0.880 
(0.354) (0.296) (0.324) (0.306) (0.328) (0.304) 
High School 1.101 1.011 0.960 1.078 1.024 1.049 
(0.255) (0.280) (0.226) (0.301) (0.244) (0.295) 
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VARIABLES Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Reported as  
relative risk ratios 













Junior College 1.055 1.543 0.954 1.578 1.014 1.529 
  (0.340) (0.570) (0.313) (0.588) (0.337) (0.573) 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.953 1.753* 0.749 2.035** 0.815 1.947** 
  (0.270) (0.566) (0.218) (0.668) (0.240) (0.646) 
Graduate Degree 0.676 2.133** 0.648 2.187** 0.727 2.089** 
  (0.215) (0.737) (0.209) (0.762) (0.238) (0.738) 
Married 1.211 0.694** 1.159 0.706* 1.162 0.715* 
  (0.191) (0.127) (0.186) (0.130) (0.188) (0.132) 
Veteran 1.687** 0.662 1.730** 0.659 1.704** 0.696 
  (0.404) (0.201) (0.422) (0.203) (0.417) (0.215) 
Republican     2.445*** 0.412*** 2.439*** 0.420*** 
      (0.373) (0.0817) (0.375) (0.0838) 
Intl Issues Interest         0.702** 1.094 
          (0.122) (0.218) 
Mil Policy Interest         1.668** 0.690* 
          (0.361) (0.145) 
Constant 0.397*** 0.871 0.285*** 1.036 0.219*** 1.316 
  (0.140) (0.310) (0.104) (0.375) (0.0876) (0.523) 
             
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 
seEform in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
        
 
E. ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
It is possible that the statistically significant findings for my key independent 
variable occur only due to the specific threshold that was selected for passing the scientific 
knowledge exam. Therefore, I conducted a robustness check by altering the passing level 
that determines whether the respondent demonstrates civic scientific literacy. Figure 2 
displays the grade distribution for the scientific knowledge test with selected thresholds 
used for the robustness check. 
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Figure 2. Test Distribution and Passing Thresholds 
As previously noted, the passing threshold for the scientific knowledge test was set 
at 10 correct questions or more out of the 12 total because this level provides a scientific 
literacy rate of around 31 percent, which is close to the 28 percent level that Miller (2016) 
found for American adults over the past decade. However, for Miller’s test analysis, 
respondents passed the exam when they scored above 67 percent. Yet, for my exam, 
comprised of easier closed-ended questions, 10 of 12 correct corresponds to an 84 percent 
score on the test. Therefore, Table 6 provides a robustness check by running my most 
comprehensive regression model for lower passing thresholds. Roughly 46 percent of test 
takers answered nine or more questions correctly with a passing threshold of 75 percent. 
Approximately 61 percent of test takers answered eight or more questions correctly 
demonstrating a passing threshold of 67 percent, the same used by Miller. Table 6 shows 
regression results for two lower thresholds (75 percent and 67 percent) as well as the 





Table 6. Robustness Check Regressions 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Reported as 
relative risk ratios 













Sci Literacy 67% 1.045 1.718*** 
(0.169) (0.322) 
Sci Literacy 75% 0.986 2.111*** 
(0.156) (0.380) 
Sci Literacy 84% 1.010 1.884*** 
(0.168) (0.340) 
Female 1.271 0.502*** 1.272 0.507*** 1.273 0.510*** 
(0.199) (0.0837) (0.199) (0.0849) (0.199) (0.0852) 
Black 0.820 0.803 0.809 0.857 0.812 0.780 
(0.172) (0.179) (0.169) (0.191) (0.168) (0.170) 
Other Race 0.619* 0.803 0.614* 0.834 0.613** 0.780 
(0.154) (0.205) (0.153) (0.213) (0.153) (0.198) 
Age 26–35 1.574 0.943 1.582 0.991 1.596 1.033 
(0.489) (0.267) (0.491) (0.282) (0.495) (0.293) 
Age 36–45 2.370*** 0.778 2.377*** 0.817 2.394*** 0.870 
(0.764) (0.244) (0.765) (0.258) (0.772) (0.274) 
Age 46–55 1.810* 1.021 1.812* 1.076 1.828* 1.138 
(0.569) (0.304) (0.569) (0.322) (0.575) (0.340) 
Age 56–65 2.563*** 0.571* 2.564*** 0.603 2.582*** 0.616 
(0.780) (0.175) (0.780) (0.186) (0.787) (0.190) 
Age 66 and older 3.273*** 0.665 3.250*** 0.719 3.278*** 0.715 
(1.001) (0.209) (0.997) (0.228) (1.006) (0.226) 
Inc $25K-$49.9K 1.173 1.359 1.172 1.343 1.170 1.312 
(0.245) (0.307) (0.244) (0.304) (0.244) (0.295) 
Inc $50K-$74.9K 1.512* 1.231 1.512* 1.184 1.504* 1.184 
(0.347) (0.314) (0.347) (0.304) (0.345) (0.302) 
Inc $75K-$109.9K 1.250 0.623* 1.260 0.587* 1.251 0.593* 
(0.312) (0.178) (0.315) (0.169) (0.311) (0.171) 
Inc $110K-149.9K 1.179 0.864 1.180 0.838 1.177 0.840 
(0.354) (0.281) (0.354) (0.274) (0.353) (0.274) 
38 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Reported as 
relative risk ratios 













Inc above $150K 1.024 0.940 1.026 0.895 1.019 0.880 
  (0.331) (0.321) (0.330) (0.308) (0.328) (0.304) 
High School 1.013 0.998 1.030 0.948 1.024 1.049 
  (0.244) (0.284) (0.247) (0.270) (0.244) (0.295) 
Junior College 1.000 1.477 1.023 1.384 1.014 1.529 
  (0.335) (0.556) (0.342) (0.523) (0.337) (0.573) 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.796 1.931** 0.820 1.720 0.815 1.947** 
  (0.235) (0.645) (0.243) (0.579) (0.240) (0.646) 
Graduate Degree 0.717 2.146** 0.737 1.900* 0.727 2.089** 
  (0.236) (0.758) (0.243) (0.676) (0.238) (0.738) 
Married 1.164 0.731* 1.162 0.713* 1.162 0.715* 
  (0.188) (0.135) (0.187) (0.133) (0.188) (0.132) 
Veteran 1.707** 0.720 1.701** 0.697 1.704** 0.696 
  (0.417) (0.222) (0.416) (0.217) (0.417) (0.215) 
Republican 2.428*** 0.414*** 2.437*** 0.416*** 2.439*** 0.420*** 
  (0.374) (0.0824) (0.375) (0.0830) (0.375) (0.0838) 
Intl Issues Interest 0.700** 1.112 0.705** 1.101 0.702** 1.094 
  (0.122) (0.221) (0.123) (0.220) (0.122) (0.218) 
Mil Policy Interest 1.673** 0.707* 1.667** 0.698* 1.668** 0.690* 
  (0.362) (0.149) (0.361) (0.147) (0.361) (0.145) 
Constant 0.217*** 1.207 0.220*** 1.228 0.219*** 1.316 
  (0.0875) (0.485) (0.0882) (0.491) (0.0876) (0.523) 
             
Observations 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 
seEform in parentheses       
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  






Model 3 of Table 6 is the most comprehensive model using the original threshold 
of 10 of 12 questions correct, or an 84 percent passing threshold on the scientific knowledge 
exam. Model 1 and Model 2 demonstrate that the results are robust to changes in the 
passing level for the exam. That is, the results hold up when the threshold for demonstrating 
scientific literacy is reduced to lower levels that some might consider more reasonable for 
a passing exam score. The direction and general magnitude of the results are similar for 
both Model 1 and Model 2 relative to Model 3. When the passing level for the scientific 
knowledge test is reduced to 67 percent, I find that compared to those fail the exam, those 
who pass the exam are 1.72 times more likely to think we spend too much on the military. 
When the threshold increases to 75 percent, compared to those who fail the test, those who 
pass the test are 2.11 times more likely to hold the opinion that the country spends too 
much on defense. My initial results for the 84 percent passing threshold falls in between 
these two figures.  
F. KEY FINDINGS 
Even with a varying number of controls, all my multinomial logistic regression 
models show a statistically significant relationship between scientific knowledge or civic 
scientific literacy and opinions on military spending. Survey participants that I classified 
as passing the GSS scientific knowledge test were far more likely to think that the country 
spends too much money on defense relative to about the right amount. These findings were 
also robust to changes in the passing level for the exam.  
Specific controls of interest provided both expected and unexpected results. 
Veterans and Republicans were both much more likely to believe we spend too little on the 
military. The oldest age group (those 66 and older) were also far more likely to feel that 
too little is spent on defense. Compared to those with less than a high school diploma, 
respondents with a bachelor’s or graduate degree were much more likely to think the nation 
spends too much on the military. Female respondents provided the most surprising finding. 
Compared to men, this group was less likely to think we spend too much on defense, 
showing nearly the same magnitude and direction as Republicans. 
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I began this research to investigate the association between scientific knowledge 
and military spending preferences. I wanted to understand the dynamic between civic 
scientific literacy among voting age Americans and their opinions on defense spending 
levels. With approximately 28 percent of the adult population qualifying as being 
scientifically literate, I decided to assess whether this informed minority maintained any 
particular beliefs about government spending on the military.  
Using data from the 2016 GSS, I created a scientific knowledge test and determined 
a passing threshold that would signify scientific literacy among respondents. For my key 
independent variable of interest, the results were both economically and statistically 
significant. Using multinomial logistic regression models, I found those exhibiting 
scientific literacy were 1.88 times more likely to believe our country spends too much on 
the military relative to individuals with no scientific literacy. Regardless of the sequential 
addition of various categories of controls, the multinomial logistic regression models 
showed the same directional viewpoint with a similar magnitude. Relative to respondents 
who failed the scientific knowledge exam, those who passed were substantially more likely 
to hold the opinion that we spend too much on defense, even when accounting for veteran 
status, political party affiliation, and an array of demographic factors.  
The 12-item scientific knowledge test had a passing threshold of 83 percent, or 
10 correct questions. This threshold was selected because just 31 percent of respondents 
scored at this level or higher, closely resembling the 28 percent civic scientific literacy 
level found in the United States by prior research (Miller, 2016). Such a threshold was 
higher than what may be considered normal for passing a test. However, another key reason 
for the 10-question level was the structure of the test. The GSS exam was comprised of 
only closed-ended questions which are easier than open-ended inquiries in prior literature. 
The question format enabled respondents to guess the correct answer. In most cases 
individuals had a 50 percent chance of being correct even when not actually knowing the 
answer or understanding the subject matter. Therefore, the threshold was chosen to not 
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only reflect findings from prior studies, but also to account for the degree of difficulty of 
the test itself.  
To rule out the possibly that this strict threshold was the primary reason for my 
statistically significant results, I conducted a robustness check by lowering the passing 
level to 75 percent and 67 percent. My results were robust to these changes, showing that 
those who pass the exam were still much more likely to believe the country spends too 
much on the military.  
A limitation of my study pertains to the inability to determine why respondents held 
their personal opinion on military spending. I cannot comment on the reason why those 
with more scientific knowledge are prone to favor less defense spending. It is important 
for analysts and policymakers to investigate the reasons for such opinions. If the 2016 GSS 
included a follow-up question asking why the respondent felt we spend too much or too 
little, categories of responses could be pooled and included in an analysis. Although polling 
data has asked more detailed and layered questions, the presence of science knowledge 
questions makes this study unique. 
Due to the limited scope of this research, there is significant room for further study. 
Other studies related to my results could involve implications to science education reform 
and how best to fund efforts to improve scientific literacy. Further study could investigate 
the implications of DoD public relations campaigns. If there is a disconnect between 
military spending trends and the perception of this spending by the public, then public 
relations may seek different methods of outreach to explain costs to voters. The same would 
hold true for other government agencies, such as NASA and the Department of Energy, 
who also have significant science and technology related budgets. 
In conclusion, this research provides valuable insight into the role of scientific 
knowledge on political views related to defense spending. The findings may be useful as 
the defense budget potentially shrinks with federal budget deficits continuing to rise. Given 
the positive views that the U.S. population has about the military, these types of studies are 
beneficial for us to use a benchmark to understand what preferences voting-age adults hold 
regarding military spending levels. 
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My research may have considerable implications for the education, scientific, and 
government communities. The alarming trends regarding scientific understanding are in 
need of correction, as technologies are only becoming more complex and more prevalent 
throughout society. Future research can highlight the importance of scientific knowledge 
among the populace and begin to remedy shortcomings. Associations between levels of 
scientific knowledge, policy knowledge, or current events and defense spending can inform 
policymakers about communication strategies with the public. DoD funding decisions 
could be communicated differently to different demographic groups to garner more 
support. Any tactics or changes to messaging can influence voting habits and potentially 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
  
45 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Alic, J. (2007). Choosing weapons. In Trillions for military technology (pp. 1–13). 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230606876_1 
American Association for the Advancement of Science. (n.d.). Introduction to SFAA. 
Retrieved November 19, 2018, from 
http://www.project2061.org/publications/sfaa/online/intro.htm 
Arons, A. B. (1983). Achieving wider scientific literacy. Daedalus, 112(2), 91–122. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20024855 
Brace, P., Sims-Butler, K., Arceneaux, K., & Johnson, M. (2002). Public opinion in the 
American States: New perspectives using national survey data. American Journal 
of Political Science, 46(1), 173–189. doi: 10.2307/3088421 
Cushing-Daniels, B., & Yeung, T.-Y. (2009). Wage penalties and sexual orientation: An 
update using the General Social Survey. Contemporary Economic Policy, 27(2), 
164–175. doi: 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2008.00132.x 
DeBoer, G. (2000). Scientific literacy: Another look at its historical and contemporary 
meanings and its relationship to science education reform. Journal of Research in 
Science Teaching, 37(6), 582–601. https://doi.org/10.1002/1098-
2736(200008)37:6<582::AID-TEA5>3.0.CO;2-L 
Eichenberg, R., & Stoll, R. (2012). Gender difference or parallel publics? The dynamics 
of defense spending opinions in the United States, 1965–2007. The Journal of 
Conflict Resolution,56(2), 331–348. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/23248500 
Fong, C. (2001). Social preferences, self-interest, and the demand for redistribution. 
Journal of Public Economics, 82(2), 225–246. doi: 10.1016/S0047-
2727(00)00141-9 
General Social Survey (2016). General social surveys, 1972–2016. Retrieved from 
https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org/  
Hartley, T., & Russett, B. (1992). Public opinion and the common defense: Who governs 
military spending in the United States? The American Political Science 
Review, 86(4), 905–915. doi:10.2307/1964343 
Knopf, J. (1998). How rational is “the rational public”? Evidence from U.S. public 
opinion on military spending. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(5), 544–571. 
Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/174559 
46 
Miller, J. (1983). Scientific literacy: A conceptual and empirical 
review. Daedalus, 112(2), 29–48. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/20024852 
Miller, J. (1998). The measurement of civic scientific literacy. Public Understanding of 
Science, 7(3), 203–223. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1088/0963-
6625/7/3/001 
Miller, J. (2004). Public understanding of, and attitudes toward, scientific research: What 
we know and what we need to know. Public Understanding of Science, 13(3), 
273–294. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1177/0963662504044908 
Miller, J. (2016). Civic scientific literacy in the United States in 2016 (A report prepared 
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration). University of Michigan. 
Retrieved from http://home.isr.umich.edu/files/2016/10/NASA-CSL-in-2016-
Report.pdf 
Page, B. I., & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992). The rational public: Fifty years of trends in 
Americans’ policy preferences. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com 
Raden, D. (1989). Interrelationships between prejudice and other social attitudes in the 
General Social Survey. Sociological Focus, 22(1), 53–67. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20831498 
Schmidt, S. (1999). Long‐run trends in workers’ beliefs about their own job security: 
Evidence from the General Social Survey. Journal of Labor Economics, 17(S4), 
S127-S141. doi: 10.1086/209945 
Sherkat, D. (2011). Religion and scientific literacy in the United States. Social Science 
Quarterly, 92(5), 1134–1150. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6237.2011.00811.x 
Witko, C. (2003). Cold war belligerence and U.S. public opinion toward defense 
spending. American Politics Research, 31(4), 379–403. Retrieved from 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X03031004003 
47 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
